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Available online 09 June 2016Memory theories assume that unconscious processes inﬂuence conscious remembering, but the exact nature of
the relationship between implicit and explicit memory remains an open question. Within the context of episodic
recognition tests research typical shows that priming impacts behavioral and neural indices of familiarity. By this
account, implicit memory leads to enhanced ﬂuency of processing, which is then attributed to ‘oldness’ in the
context of recognition judgments. Recently, however, behavioral and neuroimaging evidence has emerged to
suggest that priming can also inﬂuence recollection, suggesting that the rate of recollection increases following
priming. Here, we examine the relationship between priming and recollection, using Event-Related Potentials
(ERPs) to assess changes in the timecourse of processing. Participants studied a series of words, and episodic
memory was assessed using a standard item recognition test, but masked repetition priming preceded half of
the test cues. Results conﬁrmed that implicit memory was engaged: priming produced robust facilitation of
recognition Reaction Times (RTs), with larger effects for studied than unstudied words. Mapping onto the RT
data, ERPs recorded during recognition testing over centro-parietal electrodes revealedN400-like priming effects
(250–500 ms) that were larger in magnitude for studied than unstudied words. More importantly, priming also
had a clear impact on explicit memory, as measured by recollection-related left-parietal old/new effects. While
old/new effects for unprimed trials were present during the typical 500–800 ms latency interval, the old/new
effects seen for primed trials were equivalent in magnitude and topography, but onset ~300 ms earlier. ERPs
reveal that repetition priming speeds the onset of recollection, providing a novel demonstration that unconscious
memory processes can have a measureable, functional, inﬂuence on conscious remembering.







Within long-term memory a fundamental division is drawn
between declarative (i.e., conscious or explicit) and non-declarative
(i.e., unconscious or implicit) forms of memory (e.g., see Eichenbaum
and Cohen, 2001; Tulving, 1985). Despite this division, a central assump-
tion within memory theory is that unconscious memory processes inﬂu-
ence and support conscious remembering. To date, however, the exact
nature of the relationship between implicit and explicit memory remains
unknown. Here we present the ﬁndings of an Event-Related Potential
(ERP) study of episodic recognition memory in which we manipulated
whether test cues received implicit priming. In doing so, we were able
to demonstrate that priming can directly impact upon the timecourse of
explicit recognition - producing changes in the speed of retrieval
processing, as demonstrated by changes in the onset and duration of
memory-related ERP effects. Before outlining our speciﬁc experimental
design, we ﬁrst provide a brief overview of the core memory processesl Sciences, University of Stirling,
. This is an open access article undersupporting recognition and discuss prior evidence for interactions with
priming.
Dual-process models of recognition are dominant in the episodic
memory literature, proposing that separate familiarity and recollection
processes support retrieval (see Yonelinas, 2002, for an extensive review).
Familiarity is typically characterized as a relatively automatic process that
assesses the degree of similarity between a current event and events
experienced previously. By contrast, recollection is characterized as an
effortful process that supports retrieval of contextual details associated
with speciﬁc prior events. Importantly, some dual-process models
suggest that common processes may underlie both familiarity in recogni-
tion memory and priming on implicit memory tests (see Jacoby and
Dallas, 1981; Mandler, 1980). While growing evidence indicates that
implicit priming does inﬂuence recognition during explicit memory
tests (e.g., see Keane et al., 2006; Rajaram and Geraci, 2000; Wolk et al.,
2005), the exact details of how and when priming inﬂuences explicit
retrieval remain a matter of debate.
One approach that has proven useful for querying the relationship
between priming and episodic memory involves combining a masked
priming manipulation with standard recognition tests. Masked priming
studies involve a very brief presentation of a prime item (prior to thethe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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symbols) occupying the same visual space before and/or after the pre-
sentation of the prime. Using this approach it is possible to measure
the contribution of priming in the absence of conscious awareness of
the primes. In a seminal study focusing on illusory memory, Jacoby
and Whitehouse (1989) investigated the impact of processing ﬂuency
on recognition usingmasked repetition priming of test cues, where tar-
get items were preceded by either a brief (50 ms) presentation of the
target word (primed) or a different word (unprimed). Test words pre-
ceded by repetition were associated with an increase in the probability
that they would be classiﬁed as studied, irrespective of whether or not
they had been studied. This ﬁnding is important because it demon-
strates that priming impacted recognition decisions, andwas interpreted
as evidence supporting a link between processing ﬂuency and feelings of
familiarity (Jacoby and Dallas, 1981). Critically, however, this early study
did not employ process estimation methods, leaving the relationship be-
tween priming and speciﬁc episodic retrieval processes unclear.
Subsequent research employing similar paradigms, combined with
the Remember/Know procedure (Rajaram, 1993; Rajaram and Geraci,
2000), have largely demonstrated changes in the proportion of Know
responses, supporting the view that priming induced ﬂuency selectively
inﬂuences familiarity (e.g., see Lucas et al., 2012;Woollams et al., 2008).
For example, Rajaram and Geraci (2000) demonstrated using the R/K
procedure that presenting test items in an appropriately meaningful
context (i.e., semantically primed) increases familiarity, but has no
effect on recollection. While links between priming and familiarity are
clear, equivalent evidence for links between priming and recollection
have proved more elusive. Theoretically, a lack of priming effects on
recollection could reﬂect a hard limit on the locus of interactions
between implicit and explicit memory. Alternatively, however, the failure
to ﬁnd interactions between priming and recollection may reﬂect little
more than methodological inadequacy and over-reliance on the use of
binary R/K decisions (Higham and Vokey, 2004).
An alternative approach to dealing with concerns about the use of
the binary R/K procedure has been to employ an alternative process
estimation procedure, the independent scales methodology, where
participantswere asked to rate each item for both familiarity and recollec-
tion on a 4-point scale. Research using this approach has indicated that
priming can also inﬂuence recollection (e.g., see Brown and Bodner,
2011; Higham and Vokey, 2004). For example, Kurilla and Westerman
(2008) demonstrated that, using the independent scales methodology,
the proportion of both R and K responses increased following repetition
and conceptual primes. While the independent scales method has not
been widely adopted in the literature, these ﬁndings nonetheless add
weight to the claim that at least under certain circumstances priming
can inﬂuence recollection.
Another solution to concerns over reliance on behavioral measures is
to provide convergent evidence from neuroimaging data. For example,
Taylor and Henson (2012) employed a masked priming paradigm with
a binary R/K decision to examine the effects of repetition and conceptual
priming (e.g., brief prior exposure to meaningfully related words) on
subjective reports of familiarity and recollection. Results demonstrated
an increase in the proportion of R responses for studied words that
were preceded by conceptual primes, but not for words preceded by
repetition primes, which were associated with the standard increase in
K responses for studied andunstudiedwords. Importantly, this behavioral
ﬁnding was replicated in a follow-up fMRI study using the same design,
which additionally demonstrated that conceptual priming led to an
increase in activitywithin regions of the parietal cortex previously associ-
atedwith recollection (Taylor et al., 2013). Here, however, the increase in
R responses was found only when repetition and conceptual priming
trials were intermixed (compared to presented in separate blocks),
suggesting that the relationship between priming and recollection is
paradigm dependent.
While convergent evidence has emerged in support of the view that
priming can inﬂuence recollection, existing data points towards twoquite different consequences - changes in either the amount or speed
of processing. Claims for changes in the amount of recollection are sup-
ported by an fMRI study examining the impact of repetition priming at
encoding on subsequent memory. Gagnepain et al. (2011) contrasted
primed and unprimed auditory words presented along with distracting
sounds, ﬁnding that priming at encoding increased the occurrence of
recollection at test. In addition, the authors demonstrated that the rep-
etition priming led to a reduction in the magnitude of neural activity at
test, in regions of the Medial Temporal Lobes previously associated with
recollection. The authors suggest that priming facilitates better encoding
of contextual details, resulting in the observed increase in recollection,
because it reduces the level of attentional resources tied up in processing
item information. To our reading, the mismatch in the direction of
behavioral and neural effects complicates interpretation of Gagnepain's
ﬁndings, and the study focused primarily on the effects of priming at
encoding rather than retrieval. Importantly, however, a recent ERP
study has also demonstrated a relationship between repetition induced
ﬂuency and the amount of recollection, ﬁnding an increase in the magni-
tude of parietal old/new effects for repeated items receiving correct
source judgments (Komes et al., 2014). Taken together, these results
clearly point to a link between priming and changes in the amount of
recollection.
Support for the view that priming impacts on the timing of recollec-
tion is provided by an alternative approach, based on the measurement
of ERP correlates of retrieval. ERPs provide an ideal method for assessing
the interaction between implicit and explicit memory, providing far
higher temporal resolution than is available with fMRI data. Critically,
ERPs are known to provide distinct neural correlates of priming
and recognition, visible evenwithin the conﬁnes of a single experiment
(Rugg et al., 1998). In particular, recollection is associated with the left-
parietal old/new effect (contrasting hits and correct rejections), which
onsets around 500–800 ms post-stimulus. Importantly, as with fMRI
signals of recollection, the ERP correlate has been shown to change in
magnitude across a range of experimental manipulations designed to
inﬂuence recollection (for reviews see Friedman and Johnson, 2000;
Rugg and Curran, 2007; although see MacLeod and Donaldson, 2014).
A separate literature has clearly identiﬁed an ERP correlate of priming:
a broad negativity over posterior scalp sites (contrasting unprimed
and primed), which peaks ~400 ms post-stimulus (see Kutas and
Federmeier, 2011, for a review). Given the dissociable nature of the
neural signals associated with priming and recollection, ERPs provide an
excellent complimentary measure for assessing changes in recollection
as a function of priming.
To date, only one ERP study, which aimed to capture neural signals
associated with stimulus repetition, has reported an effect of priming
on the neural correlate of recollection. Woollams et al. (2008) suggests
that priming may inﬂuence the timing, rather than amount, of recollec-
tion. Memory was assessed using a standard word recognition test,
combinedwith R/K decisions, andmasked repetition. Primingwas carried
out at test, using a 50ms pre-exposure of half the test cues (versuswords
unrelated to the test cues in an unprimed condition). Behavioral results
revealed that priming led to an increase in K response rates, and although
recollection was not the focus of the study, results also showed that R
responses were faster following priming. As expected, R responses
elicited left-parietal old/new effects, which onset 50 ms earlier
when responseswere primed. Critically, however, the change in latency
of left-parietal effects observed in this study matched the duration of
the prime, introducing a serious interpretative concern. Because no
backwards masking procedure or measure of prime awareness was
employed, it remains possible that explicit retrieval could simply have
occurred in response to the prime rather than the target. From this per-
spective, changes in the timing of recollection simply reﬂect an artifact
of the procedure, rather than showing a direct link between priming
and recollection.
The studies outlined above point towards a link between priming
and recollection, and suggest two independent hypotheses for how
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based on existing fMRI ﬁndings, interactions between priming and recol-
lection may be expected to modulate the magnitude of recollection-
related effects, reﬂecting a change in the amount of cognitive resources
engaged during retrieval of recently primed items. Secondly, based on
theﬁndings ofWoollams and colleagues, repetition primingmay produce
observable changes in the timing of recollection-related effects, speeding
their onset. The current investigation was designed to test these two
predictions, using the ERP correlate of recollection, measured during a
word recognition memory test, in combination with masked repetition
priming. Our procedures are similar to those used by Woollams et al.
(2008), but a backwardsmaskwas introduced between prime and target
words to reduce the accessibility of primes, and crucially, participants'
awareness of primes was recorded. As we show below, by ensuring that
participants were not aware of the primes, we were able to demonstrate
that unconscious implicitmemory really does produce a genuine increase
in the speed of conscious explicit remembering.
Methods
Participants
34 right-handedEnglish speakerswith normal or corrected-to-normal
visionwere recruited from the undergraduate population at the Universi-
ty of Stirling. The local ethics committee approved the experiment prior to
commencement and written informed consent was obtained from each
participant in linewithUniversity of Stirling, Division of Psychology ethics
procedures. Participants were compensated at a rate of £5 per hour, with
the option of receiving payment for the ﬁrst hour of participation in
course credits. Data from two participants were discarded due to insufﬁ-
cient trials (b16) in critical response categories following artifact rejection
(see below for criteria). The mean age of the remaining participants was
21 years (age range = 18–34, 15 males).
Materials & design
The stimulus set consisted of 524 medium frequency concrete nouns,
between 4–9 letters in length, sampled from the MRC Psycholinguistic
database (Coltheart, 1981). Words had a mean written frequency of 23
(±11) occurrences per million (Kučera and Francis, 1967), and a mean
concreteness rating of 555 (±48). From the initial pool of words, 12
were randomly selected to be used in the practice block and another 32
were selected to act as ﬁllers shown at the start of study and test phases.
The remaining 480 critical words were divided into 4 blocks, matched on
word length, concreteness and frequency. Each block consisted of 60
study and 120 test trials. At test, all 60 studied words were presented
again, randomly intermixed with 60 unstudied new words. Half of the
studied and unstudied test trials were primed (i.e., preceded by a repeti-
tion), and the remaining trials were unprimed (i.e., preceded by theword
“blank”). The word “blank” was chosen as a neutral prime, as previous
research has demonstrated that it is a suitable baseline for ERP investiga-
tions of priming (Dien et al., 2006), in particular because it avoids
potential confounds introducedby orthnological/phonological/perceptu-
al overlapwhen using differentwordprimes. Assignment of stimuli to the
factors of test status (old, new) andmasked priming (unprimed, primed)
was fully counterbalanced across participants.
Allword stimuliwere displayed in the centre of the screen inwhite on
a black background using Courier New 18 point font. Masking symbols
used to occlude prime words (N#########b) were also presented in
white on a black background using Courier New font, but the size of the
masking symbols was increased to 24 point font and placement on the
screen was adjusted to ensure that prime words were fully concealed
across trials. Study and target words were displayed in uppercase, while
prime words were presented in lowercase. Prime and target words are
typically presented in different cases during masked priming paradigms
to ensure that resulting effects cannot merely be attributed to visualrather than lexical processing. Despite early research suggesting that
repetition priming is highly sensitive to changes in case, more recent
research on visual word recognition has clearly demonstrated case-
independent priming under subliminal presentation conditions
(Dehaene et al., 2001, 2004). Participants were seated in a testing cubicle
approximately one meter away from a 17-inch LCDmonitor. The experi-
ment was implemented using the E-Prime software package (www.
pstnet.com: version 1.2), running on a desktop computer in an adjacent
room, and participants were monitored via a video link. The screen
refresh rate was 16 ms and the accuracy and consistency of the prime
duration across trials was veriﬁed using the Black Box Toolkit (www.
blackboxtoolkit.com). Responses were recorded using a ﬁve button PST
Serial Response Box (www.pstnet.com) resting on the desk in front of
participants. Left and right index ﬁngers were used tomake all responses
and the mapping of buttons for multiple response options was fully
counterbalanced across participants. Words presented at study and test
subtended a vertical visual angle of 0.5° and amaximumhorizontal visual
angle of 5.2°.
Procedure
After application of the electrode cap, participants were provided
detailed instructions for the experiment and completed a short practice
session. Fig. 1 illustrates the study and test procedures. Each study trial
started with a warning signal (N#########b), shown in the centre of
the screen for 500 ms, followed by a single word displayed for 300 ms;
then a blank participant response screen was shown for 3700 ms. At
encoding participants were either asked to read each word out loud,
or to ﬁt each word into a short sentence; initial exploration of the data
revealed no differences in behavioral or ERP measures as a function of
encoding task, and as a result all data are reported collapsed across
task. The masking symbols used at test to occlude the prime were also
employed for ﬁxation at study to reduce the salience of the masking
procedure, and were always described as a “warning signal” denoting
that a word was about to appear. Upon completion of the study phase
participants were instructed to count backwards from 50 in increments
of 3; after 2 min the test phase instructions were presented.
Each test trial startedwith a screen instructingparticipants to press a
buttonwhen theywere ready to start the next trial, allowing participants
control over the speed of the test presentation, and ensuring that
attention was oriented appropriately. Following the participant's
key press, and a 200 ms delay, a forward mask (N#########b) was
presented for 250 ms, followed by a matching or non-matching prime
word shown for 48 ms, and then a backward mask (N#########b)
shown for 250 ms. Presentation of the prime sequence was followed by
a blank screen for 100 ms, and then the target word was shown for
300 ms, before a blank response screen was presented for 3700 ms.
During the blank response screen participants were required to indicate
as quickly and as accurately as possible, by button press, whether
the preceding target word was old or new.
When a word was classiﬁed as old, the screen then displayed details
of response options for a subsequent R/K decision; once a response was
made the screen went blank for 1000 ms, and then the next trial began.
Participants were given detailed written and verbal instructions for the
R/K decision (e.g., see Gardiner et al., 1996; Rajaram, 1993). Brieﬂy,
participants were instructed to make a 'Remember' response when
retrieval was accompanied by speciﬁc contextual details from study
exposure, and to make a ‘Know’ response when they felt that the word
had appeared in the study list, but were unable to retrieve any speciﬁc
contextual details. At the end of the experimental procedure participants
were questioned to establish their awareness of the priming manipula-
tion, before being fully debriefed.
There is no ideal method for measuring prime awareness. For
example, post hoc testing (e.g., in a different set of participants) may re-
veal awareness that is only indirectly related to levels during actual
testing. Equally, assessing awareness on each trial is more direct, but
Fig. 1. Schematic illustration of the test procedure. At test, all 60 studiedwordswerepresented again randomly intermixedwith 60unstudied newwords. Half of the studied andunstudied
test trials were primed (i.e., preceded by a repetition), and the remaining trials were unprimed (i.e., preceded by the word “blank”).
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Our approach of assessing awareness via subjective reports obtained at
the end of the experiment links the measure to our speciﬁc test partici-
pants, and avoids the possibility of cuing participants to the presence of
prime words. Responses to this questioning were classiﬁed into three
broad levels of awareness (response categories that were identiﬁed
based on responses collected during piloting). Participantswere classiﬁed
as ‘not aware’when theywere unable to report the presence of the prime
during the initial questioning and also reported that they did not detect
it after the manipulation was revealed. Participants were classiﬁed as
‘aware of blank’when theywere able to report its presence on some trials,
but on further questioning, failed to report the presence of repetition
primes. Finally, participants were classiﬁed ‘aware of ﬂickering’ when
they failed to report themanipulation, but reported that they had noticed
a ﬂicker on the screen once the manipulation had been revealed.
EEG recording and analysis
EEG was recorded from 62 scalp sites using silver/silver chloride
electrodes mounted in a Quick-Cap (Neuromedical Supplies: www.
neuro.com) in accordance with an extended version of Jasper's (1958)
International 10/20 system. A further six electrodes were used, two
positioned on the mastoids (M1, M2) to serve as a reference, two
positioned on the outer canthi to the left and right of the eyes (HEOG)
to monitor horizontal eye movements, and two positioned above and
below the left eye (VEOG) to monitor eye blinks. All electrodes were
referenced online to an additional electrode (REF) positioned midway
between the Cz and CPz. Before beginning the experiment impedances
at each electrode were brought to below 2 kΩ. Signals were recorded
with a band pass ﬁlter of 0.01–40 Hz, and digitized at a rate of 250 Hz.
Neuroscan software (www.neuroscan.org) was used to record the
EEG data (Acquire, version 4.5) and to analyse the data ofﬂine
(Edit, version 4.3). For each participant the raw EEG data was
inspected and segments were removed if they contained artifacts,
voltage drift, and excessive muscle movement. The effect of eye
blinks was reduced using the Neuroscan ocular artifact reduction
procedure, using 32blinks for eachparticipant to remove the contribution
of the average blink fromall channels. The continuous EEGdatawere then
separated into 2000ms epochs, starting 100ms before prime onset. Data
was re-referenced ofﬂine to linked mastoids and the individual epochs
were baseline corrected and smoothed over a 5-point kernel. Epochs
were rejected when they contained eye movements (HEOG) larger
than 100 μV or when drift from baseline exceeded ±75 μV in any of
the channels.
To examine priming and memory effects grand average ERPs were
formed for hits and correct rejections relative to target onset, separately
for the unprimed and primed conditions. ERPs were quantiﬁed bymea-
suring themean amplitude over speciﬁc timewindows of interest (withrespect to the mean pre-stimulus baseline). For priming contrasts a la-
tency period from 250–500 ms was chosen to be consistent with previ-
ous identiﬁcations of N400 priming effects in the literature. Formemory
contrasts, ERPs were initially quantiﬁed over the 300–500ms and 500–
800 ms latency intervals, to be consistent with previous identiﬁcations
of mid-frontal and left-parietal old/new effects (see Rugg and Curran,
2007, for a review). The mean number of trials contributing to the
waveforms for hits was 78 (S.D. = 23) for the primed condition and
78 (S.D. = 25) for the unprimed condition. The mean number of
trials contributing to waveforms for correct rejections was 94 (S.D. =
17) for the primed condition and 93 (S.D. = 18) for the unprimed
condition. Statistical comparisonswere performed using repeatedmea-
sures ANOVA and paired samples t-tests as required (signiﬁcance level
p = 0.05). The Greenhouse-Geisser correction for non-sphericity




85% of participants reported being unaware of the existence of the
masked prime, 6% detected ﬂickering on the screen but were unable
to detect any of the words, and the remaining 9% reported that they
were aware of seeing the word blank appear before the onset of the
target on a few trials, but none of the participants reported being aware
of the repetition of the target words. Memory performance, R/K propor-
tions and response times for each condition are shown in Table 1. Mean
accuracy data were analysed using ANOVA with the factors of masked
priming (unprimed, primed) and test status (old, new), which revealed
a signiﬁcant main effect of test status [F(1,31) = 28.60, p b 0.001,
ηp2=0.48], reﬂectinghigher accuracy overall for newwords. Discrimina-
tion rates did not differ (unprimed Pr = 0.68, primed Pr = 0.68), and
measures of response bias were equally conservative (unprimed Br =
0.25, primed Br= 0.27), conﬁrming that masked priming did not inﬂu-
ence measures of recognition performance. Although the R/K data reveal
a small increase in the proportion of K responses for old words that were
primed, statistical analysis of the data failed to reveal signiﬁcant
differences in the proportion of K responses, or corrected estimates
of familiarity, as a function of masked priming.
Response time data clearly evidenced faster responses for primed
hits and correct rejections, and themagnitude of primingwas also larger
overall for hits than for correct rejections. Analysis conﬁrmed a signiﬁcant
main effect of masked priming [F(1,31) = 71.52, p b 0.001, ηp2 = 0.69],
and a signiﬁcant interaction between masked priming and test status
[F(1,31) = 20.46, p b 0.001, ηp2 = 0.39]. Subsidiary analysis performed
on the difference in response times between the unprimed and primed
conditions conﬁrmed that the magnitude of priming was larger for hits
Table 1
Behavioral results. A:Memory performance and the proportion of Remember/Know responses at test (S.E.). B: Response times for hits and correct rejections, and themagnitude of priming
effects (S.E.). RT data demonstrates the presence of robust priming effects, which were larger inmagnitude for hits. Measures of recognition performance and estimates of familiarity and
recollection did not differ across conditions.
(A) Old New
Unprimed Primed Unprimed Primed
Accuracy (%) 75.11 (3.33) 75.69 (3.14) 93.05 (1.29) 92.44 (1.30)
Remember 56.64 (4.17) 56.06 (4.10) 1.62 (0.48) 1.68 (0.58)
Know 18.48 (2.70) 19.62 (2.84) 5.33 (1.15) 5.88 (1.15)
(B) Hits CRs
Unprimed Primed Unprimed Primed
RT (ms) 959.65 (26.78) 844.05 (32.72) 947.25 (31.39) 877.24 (33.45)
Priming 115.60 (12.41) 70.01 (11.73)
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tion of response time data for correct responses in the initial old/new
decision, subsequently rated asRemembered, suggested faster response
times for the primed (mean= 855.79ms, S.E. = 33.23ms) than for the
unprimed (mean= 969.64ms, S.E. = 28.86 ms) condition. In addition,
analysis conﬁrmed that response times for words subsequently reported
to be Remembered were signiﬁcantly faster for primed words than for
unprimed words (t(31) = 8.24, p b 0.001, d= 0.66). In sum, response
time data demonstrated the presence of robust priming effects, but
measures of recognition performance and process estimates did not differ
as a function of priming.ERPs
Priming effects
ERPs from the test phase were ﬁrst analysed separately for hits and
correct rejections to characterize priming effects, before comparing
the magnitude and distribution of these priming effects. Fig. 2 shows
grand average ERPs from a selection of representative sites, evidencing
the presence of positivity for primed words during the 250–500 ms
latency interval over centro-parietal sites, consistent with the timing
and distribution of N400 effects. Critically, mapping onto the response
time data, these N400-like effects appeared larger in magnitude for
hits than for correct rejections.Fig. 2. Grand average ERPs for hits and correct rejections from representative electrode sites
Topographic maps depict ERP differences between primed and unprimed trials for hits and corERP comparisons of N400 effects during the 250–500 ms latency
interval were performed on two rings of eight electrodes surrounding
CPz to adequately capture the distribution of effects (Greve et al.,
2007). ANOVAs were initially performed separately for hits and correct
rejections, including the factors ofmaskedpriming (unprimed, primed),
ring (outer, inner) and site (FCz, FC4, CP4, PO6, POz, PO5, CP3, FC3, Cz,
C2, CP2, P2, Pz, P1, CP1, C1). Analysis for hits revealed a signiﬁcant effect
of masked priming [F(1,31) = 42.32, p b 0.001, ηp2= 0.57], a two-way
interaction between masked priming and ring [F(1,31) = 49.71,
p b 0.001, ηp2 = 0.61] and a three-way interaction between masked
priming, ring and site [F(2.79,86.75) = 10.20, p b 0.001, ηp2 = 0.24].
Analysis for correct rejections also revealed a main effect of masked
priming [F(1,31)=59.96, p b 0.001, ηp2=0.65], a two-way interaction
between masked priming and ring [F(1,31) = 46.35, p b 0.001, ηp2 =
0.59] and a three-way interaction between masked priming, ring and
site [F(4.40,136.37) = 11.31, p b 0.001, ηp2 = 0.26]. As can be seen in
Fig. 2, for both hits and correct rejections, the initial analyses conﬁrm
the presence of centrally distributed N400 priming effects with a focus
over superior centro-parietal sites, maximal at electrode CPz.
The next level of analysis was performed on amplitude differences
between primed and unprimed words to compare the pattern of N400
priming effects for hits and correct rejections. To investigate whether
the hit and correct rejection effects exhibit differences in distribution,
analysis employed data rescaled with the min/max procedure
(McCarthy and Wood, 1985). Analysis were performed using ANOVA. Boxes highlight the latency interval of interest for N400 priming effects (250–500 ms).
rect rejections during the 250–500 ms latency interval.
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(FCz, FC4, CP4, PO6, POz, PO5, CP3, FC3, Cz, C2, CP2, P2, Pz, P1, CP1,
C1), and revealed no main effect or interactions including the factor of
test status, indicating that N400 effects for hits and correct rejections
did not differ in distribution. Follow up analyses were then carried out
to compare the magnitude of priming effects across conditions, using
data from CPz. The priming effect was larger in size for hits (5.15 μV)
than correct rejections (3.56 μV), a difference thatwas statistically reliable
(t(31) = 2.49, p b 0.05, d= 0.46).
Memory effects
A second set of analyses was carried out to examinememory related
ERP effects, investigated effects for the 300–500 ms and 500–800 ms
latency intervals consistent with prior literature. Fig. 3 shows grand
average ERPs elicited for correct responses during the test phase at
electrode site P3, where left parietal old/new effects are maximal. As
can be seen from the topographic distribution of effects shown in
Fig. 3, early (300–500 ms) mid-frontal old/new differences (normally
associated with familiarity, cf. Rugg and Yonelinas, 2003) were not
present. More critically, waveforms for unprimed words were more
positive going for hits than for correct rejections between 500–800 ms,
with the greatest differences at left-parietal locations. By contrast, for
primed words old/new differences with a left-parietal distribution were
evident during 300–500 ms latency interval. As is clear from Fig. 3 the
onset time of left-parietal old/new effects for unprimed and primed
words differs, with waveforms for primed words diverging ~300 ms
earlier. Given the pattern of effects, analysis focused solely on characteriz-
ing and comparing left-parietal old/new effects. Initial analysis was
designed to identify variations in the pattern of old/new effects across
conditions and timewindows. ANOVAwith the factors ofmaskedpriming
(unprimed, primed), test status (old, new), hemisphere (left, right), site
(inferior: P5, P6; medial: P3, P4; superior: P1, P2) and time window
(300–500 ms, 500–800 ms), revealed a signiﬁcant main effect of masked
priming [F(1,31)= 22.15, p b 0.001, ηp2= 0.42], and a ﬁve-way interac-
tion between masked priming, test status, hemisphere, site and time
window [F(1.2,37.6)= 4.59, p= 0.032, ηp2= 0.13], evidencing changes
in the pattern of parietal old/new effects over time as a function of
priming.
Subsequent ANOVAs performed for primed and unprimed words
within each time window included the factors of test status (old,
new), hemisphere (left, right) and site (inferior: P5, P6; medial: P3,
P4; superior: P1, P2). Analysis for unprimed words during the 300–
500 ms interval revealed a main effect of test status [F(1,31) = 4.52,
p=0.042,ηp2=0.12], and a three-way interaction between test status,Fig. 3.Grand average ERPs for hits and correct rejections at electrode P3. Boxes highlight the lat
Topographic maps depict ERP differences between hits and correct rejections for primed and uhemisphere and site [F(1.16,36.19) = 6.95, p = 0.009, ηp2 = 0.18],
reﬂecting a slight positivity for hits extending from superior sites in
the right hemisphere across sites in the left hemisphere. Analysis for
primedwords between 300–500ms revealed amain effect of test status
[F(1,31) = 24.89, p b 0.001, ηp2 = 0.44], and a two-way interaction
between test status and hemisphere [F(1,31) = 8.03, p = 0.008,
ηp2 = 0.20], conﬁrming the presence of an old/new difference over
the left hemisphere at parietal locations. The distribution of the old/new
effects from 300–500 ms is shown in Fig. 3 (column A maps); while the
effects seen for unprimed words are small and broadly distributed, a
clear left parietal old/new effect is evidenced for the primed condition.
To compare the magnitude of effects at left-parietal locations for primed
and unprimed words, the next level of analysis was performed on
subtraction data using activity averaged over three electrode sites (LP:
P5, P3, P1). Results conﬁrmed the presence of signiﬁcantly larger effects
over left-parietal sites for primed words during the 300–500 ms latency
interval (t(31) = 2.76, p = 0.01, d= 0.71).
Analysis for unprimed words during the 500–800 ms interval
revealed a main effect of test status [F(1,31) = 39.91, p b 0.001, ηp2 =
0.56] and a three-way interaction between test status, hemisphere and
site [F(1.4,42.8) = 7.03, p = 0.006, ηp2 = 0.19], reﬂecting the presence
of an old/new difference in the left hemisphere, with a maxima
over mid electrode sites. Analysis for primed words during the
500–800 ms time window produced a signiﬁcant main effect of test
status [F(1,31) = 9.86, p = 0.004, ηp2 = 0.24] and a signiﬁcant interac-
tion between test status and electrode [F(1.3,40.4) = 7.63, p = 0.005,
ηp2 = 0.19], reﬂecting more positive going activity for hits than for
correct rejections at parietal locations, focused over mid and inferior
electrodes. As can be seen in Fig. 3 (column B maps) a clear left parietal
old/new effect is visible for the unprimed condition, which was not
present in the earlier timewindow. By contrast, for the primed condition,
the pattern of effects is consistent with the continuation of the left-
parietal effect seen in the earlier timewindow. Comparing themagnitude
of old/new effects at left-parietal sites revealed signiﬁcantly larger effects
for unprimed words during the 500–800 ms latency interval (t(31) =
3.66, p = 0.001, d= 0.53).
The next level of analysis was performed on amplitude differences
between hits and correct rejections to compare the pattern of left-
parietal old/neweffects evident in 300–500ms timewindow for primed
words and the 500–800 ms time window for unprimed words. To look
for differences in the distribution of effects, analysis was performed on
rescaled data using ANOVA with the factors of time window (300–
500 ms, 500–800 ms), location (frontal, fronto-central, central, centro-
parietal, parietal, parieto-occipital), hemisphere (left, right) and siteency intervals of interest for left-parietal old/new effects (A: 300–500ms, B: 500–800ms).
nprimed trials between 300–500 ms and 500–800 ms.
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including the factor of time window, indicating that early onsetting
(300–500 ms) parietal old/new effect found for primed words did not
differ in distribution from the later effect (500–800 ms) found for
unprimed words. Overall, the foregoing pattern of results support a
difference in the onset latency of left-parietal effects for unprimed
and primed words, with effects for primed words apparent earlier.
Theﬁnal level of analysis sought tomore precisely quantify the onset
time of left parietal-effects old/new effects for primed and unprimed
words. Data were split into eight consecutive time bins starting from
target onset (0–100 ms, 100–200 ms, 200–300 ms, 300–400 ms, 400–
500 ms, 500–600 ms, 600–700 ms, 700–800 ms). Bonferonni corrected
paired t-tests were performed on data from each bin, contrasting activity
for hits and correct rejections, at electrode P3, for primed and unprimed
words. The distribution of effects, and statistical outcomes, are shown in
Fig. 4, highlighting the earlier onset of the left parietal old/new effect
following priming. Results demonstrated a signiﬁcant old/new difference
for primed words onsetting between 100–200 ms of target onset
(t(31) = 3.02, p = 0.035, d = 0.31), with differences for unprimed
words only becoming evident 400 ms after target onset (t(31) =
4.38, p b 0.001, d = 0.27); in both cases, clear left parietal maxima
are visible.
Discussion
The aim of the current experiment was to examine the relationship
between priming and recollection. Two independent predictions were
made concerning how priming could impact neural correlates of recol-
lection. Firstly, following Gagnepain et al. (2011) priming might reduce
themagnitude of old/new effects, indexing a reduction in the amount of
cognitive resources engaged during retrieval. Secondly, following
Woollams et al. (2008) repetition priming might produce observable
changes in the timing of left-parietal old/new effects, speeding their
onset. Here, to address these predictions, we used ERPs to measure
the neural correlates of retrieval during a recognition memory task -
includingmasked priming of half of the cues presented at test. Critically,
the behavioral data demonstrated facilitation of response times for
primed words, which was greater for hits than for correct rejections.
Despite this strong evidence of the operation of priming at test, measures
of accuracy, discrimination, bias, and process estimates of familiarity and
recollectionwere unaffected by the primingmanipulation. Mapping onto
the RT data, however, N400-like priming-related ERP effectswere evident
over centro-parietal locations during the 250–500ms latency interval and
were larger in magnitude for studied than unstudied test items. Most
importantly, memory contrasts demonstrated that priming inﬂuenced
the left-parietal old/new effects associated with recollection, speeding
their onset. In short, the ﬁndings conﬁrmed the prediction derived fromFig. 4. Topographic maps depict the difference between the hits and correct rejections for bot
establish the onset time of left-parietal old/new effects across conditions. Statistical outcomesWoollams et al. (2008), providing evidence of a genuine change in the
onset latency of recollection following priming.
In light of prior work demonstrating an increase in the proportion of
recollection following priming (i.e., Taylor and Henson , 2012; Taylor
et al., 2013), the absence of differences in behavioral measures of
memory in the current study appears somewhat surprising, although
not inconsistent with prior work using a similar methodology to the
one reported here (i.e., Woollams et al., 2008). One key difference in
design that could account for failure to ﬁnd performance differences
is the nature of the prime itself. For example, Taylor and Henson
(2012) report an increase in the R responses for conceptual primes
but no changes in recollection following repetition primes. By contrast,
Higham and Vokey (2004) report an increase in illusory R responses for
targets preceded by repetition primes. Taken together, ﬁndings from
studies examining the relationship between priming and recollection
suggest that the inﬂuence of priming on behavioral measures of
recollection is highly material/context speciﬁc. As such the ﬁndings of
the current study serve to highlight the importance of obtaining concur-
rent neural measures to elucidate interactions between priming and
recollection.
Before discussing the theoretical implications of the current ﬁndings,
we outline prior evidence that the timing of recollection is not inherently
ﬁxed - despite it typically being described as a slow form of retrieval. For
example, De Chastelaine et al. (2009) found that parietal old/new effects
decreased in latency overmultiple study-test repetitions, moving into the
time window for the FN400 (decreasing from 400 ms to 300 ms), and
were associated with amatched increase in discrimination and reduction
in reaction times across test repetitions. In another ERP study, Vilberg
et al. (2006) reported an early onsetting left-parietal effect similar to
the one found here, during a sourcememory task employing amodiﬁed
R/K procedure, where participants were required to indicate whether
visual objects were fully or partially recollected. Crucially, the authors
found that full recollection of contextual information was associated
with earlier onsetting left-parietal effects between 200–500 ms after
stimulus onset. In a more recent study, Murray et al. (2015) linked
early onsetting left parietal effects (300–500 ms) with high precision,
using a novel sourcememory task that allowed the quantity and quality
of retrieval to be examined independently. In short, all of the preceding
studies associate superior recollection with changes in the onset of
parietal old/new effects. In this context, the current data adds weight
to the view that the timing of retrieval processing can vary:manipulating
unconscious repetition priming selectively inﬂuences the onset and
duration of recollection.
Priming can potentially facilitate processing at a number of stages,
each of which could contribute to observed change in the timing of rec-
ollection related ERP old/new effects reported here. For example, faster
visual (perceptual) or semantic (conceptual) processing could produceh conditions from target onset (0 ms), split into the 100 ms time bins that were used to
conﬁrm the earlier onset of the left-parietal old/new effect following priming.
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leading to a reduction in the onset time of recollection. Similarly,
Gagnepain et al. (2011) proposed that priming facilitates better
encoding and results in an increase in recollection because it reduces
the level of attentional resources tied up in processing item information.
While this explanation was posited to explain changes in the magnitude
of neural activation and behavioral indices of recollection following
priming, faster processing of item information could also account for
the current ﬁndings, leading to changes in the timing of neural signals.
In the current data, N400-like effects for primed and unprimed words
differed in magnitude but not in onset time, suggesting that the early
onsetting recollection effect was not merely a result of knock-on
facilitation from processing occurring earlier (i.e., downstream). Overall,
therefore, the present data suggest that recollection onsets earlier
following priming, but that this effect cannot be attributed simply to
changes in the speed of initial processing or reading of test items that
would allow for more rapid visual identiﬁcation of the word itself.
The orthogonal nature of the analysis employed for priming and
memory contrasts in the current study adds weight to the suggestion
that semantic processing is not a necessary pre-cursor for recollection.
For primed words the left-parietal old/new effect onset around 100 ms
post-target in the memory contrast, while N400-like effects in the
priming contrast were not evident until around 250 ms post-target.
Theoretically, these ﬁndings suggest the need to reconceptualize how
priming is characterized, including the nature of its inﬂuence on cognitive
processing. Our view is that priming is not a process per se (i.e., that can
be linked to a speciﬁc neural correlate), but is instead something that
happens to processes (i.e., reﬂects a change in the operation of processes).
By this view, priming can exert inﬂuence over a wide range of cognitive
processes (e.g., at perceptual and conceptual stages), leading to different
measurable changes in associated neural correlates, depending on what
is being primed. This view sits at odds with traditional systems models
of memory, where priming is seen as a form of procedural memory,
analogous to recollection as a form of declarative memory (e.g., see
Squire, 2004), adding weight to calls for alternative frameworks
(e.g., see Henke, 2010).
While, our ﬁndings clearly demonstrate that priming directly inﬂu-
ences recollection, the question remains of exactly how priming speeds
the onset of retrieval, particularly as this appears not to be attributable
to faster processing of item/semantic information, due to the later onset
of N400 effects. One possibility is that priming results in test items cross-
ing the threshold for retrievalmorequickly (e.g., due toprimingproviding
itemswith an elevated baseline). Currently, the precise nature of recollec-
tion itself remains a matter of debate (e.g., see Harlow and Donaldson,
2013; Slotnick et al., 2014; Wixted et al., 2010; Yonelinas et al., 2010),
with all-or-none thresholded, continuous and combined descriptions of
recollection all being proposed in the literature. Combined models of
recollection would accommodate an activation account of the inﬂuence
of priming on recollection, but the onset time of N400 effects and the
lack of a difference in the magnitude of left-parietal effects in the current
study appears to negate this explanation of the data. While most models
consider recollection to be a univariate retrieval process responsible for
retrieval of contextual details of prior episodes, it has recently been
suggested that recollection is bivariate (Brainerd et al., 2014). In essence,
these authors distinguish between target and context forms of recollec-
tion, providing a potential explanation for the timing changes reported
here: while occurring concurrently under standard recognition testing,
subcomponents of recollection could be differentially engaged following
priming, resulting in the observed change in onset time across conditions.
Our view is that recollection is unlikely to reﬂect a unitary process,
and the rise of models that fractionate recollection into subcomponents
is inevitable. We are not entirely convinced, however, that item versus
context distinctions reﬂect real divisions within memory. Assuming
that the retrieval of item and contextual occurs separately, and contex-
tual recollection takes longer than item recollection, this would suggest
that LP effects in the current study for unprimed words index contextrecollection, while effects for primed words index pure item recollection.
On this basis, repetition pushes items over the threshold for item recollec-
tion, which in the absence of contextual reconstruction, occurs earlier,
potentially accounting for the difference in onset time found here.
While theoretically possible, to our minds, it is not compelling to
argue that a single neural correlate arbitrarily reﬂects different processes
in this way. We are also unclear how a ﬂexible memory system could
distinguish between item and context information a priori - given that
deﬁnitions reﬂect experiment speciﬁc control over stimuli (such that
a single piece of information could be considered item or context,
depending on how memory is tested).
More broadly, we highlight the fact that the idea of two forms of
recollection is not entirely new. For example, Moscovitch (2008) pro-
posed a two-stage model of recollection. By this account, the ﬁrst stage
is a rapid automatic retrieval process that occurs when a retrieval cue
interacts with stored information, but its products are not accessible
to consciousness. The second stage is more closely aligned with
dual-process accounts of recollection, being slower and accessible
to consciousness. Within this characterization of recollection, repetition
primes in the current study acted as a proximal retrieval cue, engaging
the ﬁrst stage of recollection in the primed condition, while the unprimed
condition relied on conscious recollection to bridge the temporal gap
between study and test, resulting in the observed difference in onset
time. While Moscovitch's model could be characterized as closer to the
dual-process distinction between recollection and familiarity, than the
dual-routes to recollection account of Brainerd et al., the ability of this
kind of account to accommodate the current ﬁndings adds weight to
the need for more sophisticated models of recollection.
What is clear from the preceding discussion is that the precise nature
of recollection remains to be fully established. Proposals that recollection
is multifaceted have had limited impact on the ﬁeld to date, presumably
due to difﬁculties inherent in isolating the operation of sub-types of recol-
lection during recognition testing. Crucially, the two formulations of dual
recollection outlined above differ onwhether the products of retrieval are
implicit or explicit. On the basis of the current study, whether implicit
priming merely speeds the onset of recollection as traditionally
conceived, or facilitates a speciﬁc sub-type of recollection that occurs
more rapidly remains an open question. Equally, it remains unclear
whether recollection is best fractionated in terms of distinctions between
item versus context information (cf. Brainerd et al., 2014), proximal
versus distal cueing (cf. Moscovitch, 2008), or quantity versus quality of
retrieval (cf. Murray et al., 2015). Regardless, the current data clearly
demonstrates that priming can directly inﬂuence recollection. Moreover,
the ﬁndings highlight that gaining a better understanding of the
inﬂuence of priming could play a critical role in elucidating the nature
of recollection.Conclusion
Here we aimed to investigate interactions between priming and
recollection by employing ERPs to monitor neural markers of memory
processing during recognition with masked priming of test cues. Over-
all, our ﬁndings clearly demonstrate that priming can inﬂuence the
time at which neural signals of recollection will be observed, leading
to faster retrieval processing. While early onsetting recollection effects
have been reported previously, the exact nature of the early onsetting
recollection effect reported here following priming remains an open
question. Future work is required to establish whether these changes
in recollection merely reﬂect a change in timing or also reﬂect changes
in the quality, quantity or type of retrieval. The addition of an incidental
source task or the introduction of context priming in the current design
would help to differentiate between these options. Nonetheless, the
current data contributes additional insights to a slowly growing literature
demonstrating that priming does inﬂuence recollection, and underlines
the importance of obtaining neural measures for further progress in
16 J.L. Park, D.I. Donaldson / NeuroImage 139 (2016) 8–16understanding the complexities of recognition, andmore importantly, the
true nature of priming and recollection.
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